Oral History Interview

NSA-OH-11-81

with

Helen M. O'Rourke

17 November 1981

T542 Interview Room NSA, SAB 2

by R. D. Farley

FARLEY:

Today is 17 November 1981. Our interviewee, Helen M. O'Rourke. Miss O'Rourke joined the Signal Intelligence Service at Arlington Hall in 1943 and served as a cryptanalyst on Japanese crypt systems. Toward the end of World War II and for some years later, she served in the Target Intelligence Committee Group and later in the Target Exploitation, or TAREX, Group, for AFSA and for NSA. Miss O'Rourke will discuss her career and experiences since the early 1940s. Our interview is taking place in the T542 area, SAB 2 at NSA. Interviewer: Bob Farley. Miss O'Rourke desires that the classification of these tapes be TOP SECRET CODEWORD.

Might as well get underway...appreciate you taking some time to put it on tape for ever and ever and ever. In order to start it off, would you mind recalling your personal background; that is, teenager on and education, before you came into the SIS.

Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 02-03-2017 pursuant to E.O. 13526: MDR-83627

O'ROURKE:

I grew up in Duluth, Minnesota. Spent all my childhood there and went to the Duluth Branch of the University of Minnesota, where I graduated with a BE degree and went to teaching. That was in 1934, and at that time we were in the midst of a real depression. I went to teach at a very small school in Minnesota...it was a one-room school, and we were a demonstration school for the college, so I always had practice teachers with me. And then following that, I went to teach on an Indian Reservation at Grand Portage, Minnesota. Spent two years there, and from there I went to teach high school in Aitken, Minnesota, and it was in Aitken that I received a notification from General...Chief Signal Officer, Olmstead, indicating that they would be interested in having me work for the office of the Chief Signal Officer.

FARLEY:

Helen, how do you think they got the information on you?

O'ROURKE:

They wrote to the college...

FARLEY:

Oh, all right.

O'ROURKE:

...and asked for recommendations. The college had recommended me, and I

CRITERIA

had since learned that the eriterion was very simple. They were just looking

for people who were educable. There was hardly any place to find trained

cryptanalysts at that stage, so they just asked the colleges to recommend

names, and at the time, we were all so involved in the terrors and horrors

of Pearl Harbor...we were all so angry. I was very enthused and dedicated,

I decided it was the right thing to do...to come and help.

FARLEY:

Right. Adid they have any ...did you have any language or any mathematics, or any...

O'ROURKE:

No, I was an English major...

FARLEY:

...statistics or ...?

O'ROURKE:

O'ROURKE:

TOP SECRET//SI

CRITERIA

O'ROURKE: The only eriterion was people who were educable.

FARLEY: ... That could be educated, yeah.

And Preceived I had filled the applications out, and I received my appointment. And this was a very small town where messages telegrams came through the office at the railroad station, and the appointment telling me to report was garbled, and the telegrapher asked if I wanted a service on it, and I said, "No." And I was then appointed a cryptographic specialist, but you see, he didn't know what the words were, so nobody really knew what my job was to be.

FARLEY: They had offered you a salary...they offered the dollars, and...?

O'ROURKE: Yes. I'm thinking it was...let's see... I was a cryptographic...a SP-6,

and I think the salary might....it was like \$1295, I think.

FARLEY: Which was a raise in pay for you really, huh?

Yes, it was, and coming to Washington, and coming to help with the war effort. Was terribly important. And so I remember serving on the Board of School Teachers or among the school teachers, giving out sugar rationing books the night before I came. You see, people had to have meat stickers and sugar ration books, but we sent those out before I came. When I got here....I was new to Washington...new to Arlington... there was just nothing that I was familiar with. I stayed at the YWCA on K Street, and was informed, after I telephoned, that there would be an unmarked bus that would come out K Street. It was very. In a way, it was rather an adventure, because, well, I didn't know anything about Washington, I didn't know what I was going to do when I got here, and I had a name and a number to call, which was Arlington

Hall. And at that time, the bus ran out to the ... on Arlington Blvd., so

TOP SECRET//SI

we got off and went into the Hall. And we went into, what was then Headquarters Building. It had been the girl's school. This was 1 March 1943, and 150 of us came that day. It was completely overwhelming to the staff. They had been evidently getting five and ten...a few people at a time, and this was a surprise and numbers that they weren't ready for. And I remember the lady in charge was a Miss Crist, and she kept trying to make sense out of what they could do with us...for us, and one of the people in the group with me, and who has always remained a friend, was Mrs. Carl Klitzke, MEleanor Carmen. We were in this group. Anyway, they decided, finally, before the end of the day, that they had to swear us, in by giving us an oath, but at that...before that everybody had read and signed an oath, evidently. They didn't know how to administer this except to do it in large groups, so they read it to us, and we promised orally to observe the conditions of the oath. And then we were put into little classrooms on the third floor of Arlington Hall, in the Headquarters Building. They had been bedrooms for the students, and we sat there twelve people to a room with a proctor...one supervisor, and we were assigned there. We were working on... I think it must have been Military Cryptanalysis, Part I, 1932...the old one...the little one. And we worked very diligently...very hard on these programs...projects. And then we were moved over to B Building. We brought pencils and our little papers, and we... I remember it was...oh it might have been the last part of April...it was muddy, and we were ushered into B Building...it must have been Wing 8. There are 8 wings in B Building. And there we had classes. We had small classrooms and the only person

who was in charge, was again, the woman who had been in charge. Her name was Grace somebody. She was in charge of the mechanics of getting us in and out and having us sit down and work. And she had an alarm clock, and when it was time for a break, the alarm clock rang. When we could go to lunch, the alarm clock rang. It was far from the professional systems they have now. During that time, we weren't sure why some people were leaving. There was a great interest everytime anybody was assigned. We had no idea where they were to be assigned, but they would be taken out. We never did figure out why some of them would go and some would not, and I would work harder and harder on these lessons, and try to do better and better. It has since come to me that they had to go to Minnesota to check my background, and so it took me a little longer for a clearance, you see. And we didn't know at the time; we had no idea of why we were sitting there when some people were assigned more quickly.

FARLEY:

Helen, did anybody at any time give you an orientation or a briefing or explain what was going on?

O'ROURKE:

No, no. Well, of course, we were told that...yes, we were told that this was to be a cryptographic operation. We were working on Military Cryptanalysis. We knew we were solving these cryptograms. We knew we were going to do that. The big picture of COMINT was never presented at that time, at least at our level, never. We knew, of course, that it was to be cryptographically related, obviously, and we knew it had to do with communications. At the time we had no idea the extent

or anything about that. We were terrifically impressed with the security angle. I lived in a boarding house. The name of it was "Linger Long", and it was on the George Washington Campus. The people in the house were State Department people and OSS, and at that time, I had no idea what OSS was, but they didn't know where I worked. We didn't discuss it. There was no relationship to any kind about the details of our jobs. Enormous attention to security. Then when I was assigned, I was assigned to a section, and I'm not sure at the time if it was B-2, but I think it probably was.

FARLEY:

Which was ...?

O'ROURKE:

The Japanese systems. And We were seated at long tables and given overlap paper, and we were to record these messages. We were to transfer them from letters to digits. You see, they have a ten-digit substitution, and we were to transfer them from the letter to the digit and write them on these overlaps to prepare them, you see, for the people who were eventually going to decrypt the messages.

FARLEY:

O'ROURKE:

Was there any pattern...would you just write them in any order, propositive, no. We recorded first ten groups, left to right; the next ten groups, right to left, you see, because the additive had been extracted in a serpentine or boustrophedon fashion. At the time, it took me a little while to even figure out, or somebody finally told me, why we were doing it that way. Then I went from there...oh, at that time, the person in charge was...I believe he was a corporal, not a sergeant, his name was George Schneider. He had been an accountant with At General Motors. He was a very bright man...very positive, and he had

no sense of rank...he was in charge! And he ordered everybody around, including new lieutenants, and that caused a little stir. I've since read in some of the history, that that had caused quite a stir.

And one time Frank Lewis came, assembled us all in a group and he sat with his feet in a chair. He sat on the back on the chair and told us that we were worth to this organization only what our brains would allow us to produce. There was no rank, When we got into that door there was no rank to be considered, and our brains were the only element that would be of any value. And he as much as said, "Stop all this complaining about rank"... people who weren't observing rank.

FARLEY:

O'ROURKE:

Oh yes, oh yes...The civilians were drawn largely from the colleges of North Carolina...lots of teaching...lots of ex-teachers.

North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, I think I might have been...

I think the Minnesota group might have been some of the far western groups that were there...Michigan, and New England. And the enlisted men had come largely from the colleges in the east, whithe Ivy League colleges. They were corporals. They had been promised commissions, and they worked very hard and they were very bright and very good people, but they were not happy being corporals when they had been promised commissions. Helen, why do you think that the recruitment was primarily based on the eastern...from the eastern coast? Was it geography?

FARLEY:

O'ROURKE:

Probably. I think maybe they were getting as many people as they needed without going farther west. And this, that was a traveling distance that most people could accommodate...it just seemed to me. Later on in the spring, in about April, perhaps, they asked all of us to recommend friends, and we had a general campaign for recommending people, and I recommended three more people from Minnesota who came and worked here a long time.

Marian Jenkins was one and Dorothy Prahl was one and Mary Alice Shaw.

FARLEY:

I'll be darned.

O'ROURKE:

And So, were the four of us, but they had a very earnest campaign for it.

FARLEY:

Helen, were most of them frightened, wide-eyed young gals who came to

the big city for the first time?

O'ROURKE:

Sometimes, yes. A great many of them lived at Arlington Farms, and that in itself was an experience. They would announce over the loud speakers at work that there was no hot water at Arlington Farms that night and to wash their faces before they went home, or something. There were all sorts of problems, and Arlington Farms was not soundproof. We had people who complained that their neighbors talked together without bothering to go out the door, and be in the same room. They'd talk right through the intervening rooms. It was an about they had a good time. It was very sociable, where was lots of sociability. People were there away from home and they were earnestly trying to do a good job, and they were all pretty young. Everybody was quite young, and they had all really a very enjoyable social life.

FARLEY:

Do you remember what it cost it for your room...your room rent per month?

O'ROURKE:

It was probably...well it was room and board...two meals -- breakfast and dinner. It was probably \$50.00, something like that. We all had breakfast together and we all had this dinner together, and then everybody retired immediately to the local drugstore for sandwiches right after dinner. And it was a sociable group in a way, but we were not sharing; nobody shared anything about their jobs -- nobody. And there was nobody at this boarding house that also worked at Arlington Hall. Although I walked over to K Street to get the bus, and waiting at the bus were Dr. Sam Chew and Dr. Leslie Rutledge. They were roommates on the other side of K Street. They would signal whether I had lots of time, or whether I should hurry if the bus were coming. We rode together on this bus for a long time and I never did know their names, and was completely surprised one day, when I was assigned, to see that Dr. Chew was a book breaker...surprised to find him there, but nobody spoke at their jobs; nobody spoke of why they were there. Now Dr. Chew and Dr. Rutledge had come from Kansas. teaching, and I think Dr. Rutledge had been in Wisconsin. They were civilians, Athey were not so they had been recruited in some fashion from there. We got to be very good friends, meverybody, mygu seen we worked on a three-shift plan; day, swing shift and graveyard. There were very, very limited eating facilities. In the daytime there was a cafeteria....no black people admitted. M

FARLEY:

Is that right?

O'ROURKE:

...at all, and, in fact, there were no black people. We'd had to submit pictures, so there were no black people, mat first, puto.

FARLEY:

This was in mid '43?

O'ROURKE:

In '43. We had a cafeteria at noon and I believe they had a cafeteria for a supper hour. Through the night, we didn't have anything except these "slot machines". Athese dispensed cokes, candy bars, etc.

FARLEY:

Did you have snack bars in there or not?

O'ROURKE:

No, no snack bars. We had machines, prerackers and candy bars. and or the midnight shift we would stop at Buckingham and buy donuts or whatever, and then save them through the night, and about two or three in the morning we would have coffee....oh, if we had coffee...sometimes it would be just cokes from the machines. Sometimes we heard a sound in the middle of the night of this rushing of nickels out of the machine, and somebody would have broken into the "slot machine." And then we would hear the running footsteps of the guards, and never quite altogether hear what had happened, but everybody knew the sound of the rushing of the nickels out of the "slot machines in the dark of the night, and always late. And as summer came on, we'd hear this sound coming through the open windows; guards yelling, "Halt, who goes there?" The girls would walk around the building at night for air and to keep awake, and then the guards would conduct this procedure that they had learned, "Halt, who goes there, lay your badge down," and we'd hear all this coming through the windows, and, you see, it was all dông Mt was vall very sociable really. Anyway, at night was a very eerie time and it was a time that people got very close, because you would experience this; this was new to everybody, to be working at night

that way, And I remember that the men in the barracks could not bring food back; that was against their rules, but periodically somebody would bring back toast...dry and burnt, but they would bring back toast, and people would think that was a very great tribute to have them bring in some toast at four in the morning. You see, they went for breakfast at four, and everybody else had to wait until eight, but through the summer months, it was difficult, because the daytimes were very hot, and people had had difficulty sleeping, and then at night, it was cooler and more comfortable, but they hadn't had enough rest, and sitting quietly and subtracting numbers didn't keep them awake too well.

FARLEY:

Got pretty boring, right?

O'ROURKE:

We had one lady who was a PhD from Washington. She was from Washington...Dr. Louella Tressman, and she would poise her pencil on her overlap and her eyes would be closed, and she would really be asleep, although she would be looking as though she were writing. Then we had young lieutenants that were trying to keep people in line, and they would stamp past her with a heavy-footed stamping, to wake her up. That was really....well, anyway...it wasn't really too mean, but...and nobody corrected anybody. You see, there was no discipline; it was so that woold But we had tremendous ability. At they could keep her awake. RECOVERING that time, we were receving a hundred additives to a page, and, of course, the messages were enciphered by these additives. We were recovering the hundred additives to the page, and people would recover as many as a hundred additives a night. This was the Japanese Water Transport System...2,4,6,8, and they worked very hard. There were people who had almost memorized

the codebook, and could write the decoded groups as fast as they could write them down. A great production; it was really a very astounding production at that time. Did you want me to go back and talk about

FARLEY:

Anything, anything, Helen.

some other things first?

O'ROURKE:

At first it was absolutely manual. There was just no assistance. We had a few little brute-force runs where they would have given us frequent cribs...the code values for cribs, and by subtracting five groups to...just by absolutely subtracting, we could run the subtracted figures through the brute-force and see if we were getting any stereotyped text, but we had very limited aids. It was largely done by knowing stereotypes... knowing usual beginnings, numbers, punctuations, and actually trial and error...just trying the groups until we could get something that was reading. At first, the indicators were in the clear, and you could apply the messages to the overlap in the order in which they would have been extracted, so that you had depth, and you knew you had depth. Later they enciphered the indicators in a very simple fashion and it wasn't as easy to get overlaps. By that time, people were studying ways of providing assistance and providing machine assistance, so that there were aids being developed, And, but at first, it was a completely manual-, memorytype operation. If you could remember a stereotype, you would insert those groups and try to see if you had working additive. I think it was well into June or July before we had significant aids. It was a complete memory operation.

FARLEY:

Did you ever use the National Cash Register?

IOP SECRET//ST

O'ROURKE:

Oh yes. Those were difference machines. We took the difference...you see, all of this was subtractive, and we would take differences on both big machines.

FARLEY:

Were they useful? Were they of help?

O'ROURKE:

Yes, yes. You see, this was all trial and error but it helped your.

it speeded up your trial. The best of all the really best was first

your memory of the stereotyped, The groups that would go together

Then we had

would be together in a group, and that was a tremendous aid, The

Japanese Water System would give in code groups the ship name.

Following that would be a group which meant "open brackets", and then they would spell out the ship name in Kana groups followed by "close brackets", which would give you the values for the preceding code groups and set you in business for considerable time. Those were just boons to everybody;

the ship names, the "open" and "close brackets". One of the things you

beginnings was to try "open" and "close brackets", as far as you could.

'ARLEY:

When you came in, to do your job, did they hand you a pack of traffic and say, "Put it on the overlay," or were there....

did after you tried all the punctuation and all the stereotyped

O'ROURKE:

Yes.

FARLEY:

Was everything set up, or would one person start and then the next shift would come in and...?

O'ROURKE:

Well, at the beginning, it was a complete recording operation.

We had a little lady who was in charge, and I don't even know her name anymore,

I can't remember where the selection was made, but you were given traffic

that was enciphered by one additive pad, you see, the indicators would

have placed that traffic together on that one sheet. We knew at that time, of course, that we were recording messages. It was very early or very soon that we learned why we were recording them in the serpentine fashion that we were doing. At first, we just wrote overlaps. We weren't even decoding, and then later we were given instruction in how to subtract and we ware given instruction in ... I think we were given instruction in frequent groups to look for. I know we were given instruction on the punctuation, the brackets, and some stereotyped beginnings to test. And Dr. Chew was book breaking. The book wasn't entirely recovered, and we were, by using the stereotyped phrases that we knew, recovering additive, and consequently, other toda groups. Then we would take them to Dr. Chew, who was book breaking, to see if this were a bonafide message. And he, in turn, recorded the groups that were being recovered, so that he was building the book, you see. Then when we recovered ship names, we took the ship names to the next wing to Dr. Julia Ward, who had a file on her desk; a card file. She was recording the names of ships, the codegroups, and the syllablized names. m In other words, if you had three syllables of the name and not the last, you could go to her and probably find what the last syllable of that ship name would be, because she was keeping a record of all recovered ship names. This was hand-done. This was at her desk. You walked with your ship name over to Dr. Ward, you walked to Sam Chew with your stereotyped phrase, and he, in turn, was recording the groups as recovered, and then They were printing code books. And the code book... I can't even remember

if they were IBM, but they were prints and they would be changed very periodically, you see, very frequently updated. Finally we were all working with printed code books. I can't even tell you Whigh when the moment came that we really knew what we were doing. It became clear very soon that we were aware of the text and aware of what the phrases were saying. We worked very closely with the Japanese translators, the young men from college, who came and would sit with us, and on the basis of what we were recovering, suggest other groups that might go along with the text. And they worked very closely with us, and then, of course, they did the translating. Many times we didn't see finished translations. We would just go as far as we could with the decoding and they would tell us that the messages were reading. We did acquire a certain sense of what was being said, and then they did the translating and sent the messages on in what we called "bulletins". These were typed on 5x8 cards, and then they would, of course, be sent to G-2 for use. We weren't terribly clear about the final use of the material at the beginning, but then Frank Lewis did something very fine. The most frequent result of our work was the sinking of the convoy, or the successful attack on a convoy, because we were decrypting water transport messages having to do with the Japanese convoys. Frank Lewis would come and tell us that from the headlines that we'd read in the paper, there had been a success and that we had participated in it, or we had contributed to it. It was a shot in the arm many times, because people...we were just...we were working in digits and unknown Japanese phrases, so it was good to know that we were doing something right.

FARLEY:

Did you get a frequent feedback from Frank?

O'ROURKE:

No, no. One of the things we would get...as we got going, the messages were in parts, and whereas you might be able to read two and three parts of the message, in other words, you would find the proper placement and the additives to recover, you might not have the completion of the message. And we had a Lieutenant, Jack Russell, you probably know him, who would come by and say, "They're waiting for the rest of this message!" And it was very difficult for the intelligence people to understand that no matter how much they wanted the rest of that message, if you couldn't find it, or if you couldn't find the additive that read it, it was an uphill fight. And I can remember having everybody alerted... "You must find the placement of the rest of a certain message," because it was so vital. Sometimes it could be done.

FARLEY:

Helen, what would be the common denominator of a six-part message, for instance? Was it a serial number, a date-time-group, do you remember how you sorted them down?

O'ROURKE:

Number and then part...part one, part two...

FARLEY:

Hatsu, and....

O ROURKE:

Well, that was "from" and "to"....hatsu and chia...

FARLEY:

Yeah, hatsu and chia, that's right.

O'ROURKE:

Yes, where you'd get the point of origin and the address, and it would be their number; it would be the message number and the part. And at that time, they weren't dividing the messages, nothe messages went straight through, and weren't being bisected. At the beginning, when you realize it, things were very simple, and very

straightforward and rather successful, therefore, you didn't have to be too discouraged. And I remember, under Captain Freytag and Captain Seindenglanz, they decided to set up a production standard. They decided to whip up production, and we never were able to quite tell them that the person who could read a hundred additives a night was somebody who could write fast and who could subtract fast. Somebody who might recover 50 additives, might have done some very ingenious thinking and some terrific research to get the 50 out; whereas the people who were getting a hundred, were working with stereotypes and something that was just flowing easily. And that was awfully difficult to explain; very difficult, because production was a very important thing, because they tried very hard, of course, to recover all the additive. Once the additive was recovered, Major Dunwell of IBM, who was assisting with our IBM machine section, who worked with us, would come in his extra time and work with us, recovering additive, to see what he could do to help. He went over and Mawired machines and adapted the existing machines to the needs we had, so that we were finally able, through his help and through the help of the people in the section, to apply recovered additive to messages; thus we had machine translations; that is, decryptions of messages once we had the additive recovered. They could place the messages and read them by machine. And that was an enormous step. Many times recently when we were looking at the Water Transport messages, as we declassified them, people who were doing the declassification wondered why there would be a block of messages, that had been transmitted in May, but the whole block would

be translated in August. They wouldn't understand that finally when additive had been recovered, they could send those messages over and have them all translated in a block...together. I think that it was a little confusing to some of the people who were declassifying to see delayed translation dates and then a whole block translated at the same time. I think probably the beginning of September of '43, when they were able to apply the machine techniques to translate. There was enough additive recovered by then and the code book recovered.

FARLEY:

Helen, was there any way to determine significance or priority of Japanese messages and provide that to some of the more talented "cryppies?"

O'ROURKE:

Yes, when I must be phase I'm telling you about was primarily "spade" work. People were just recovering additives; just recovering. But then there was a time, as I spoke, when they knew that they needed another part of a message that they were very interested in, then there was an effort to find the part and to recover that message. But later, there was distinct priority.

FARLEY:

Helen, let me switch, please.

END TAPE 1, Side 1

BEGIN Tape 1, Side 2

FARLEY:

Shall we continue?

O'ROURKE:

I'm not quite sure of the dates... I'm not quite sure of when certain accomplishments were made. We began to have all sorts of assistance, from just Sam Chew with his card file and Dr. Julia Ward with her card file and Ann Caracristi and Wilma:...then Berryman...Davis now... had an address section and they were covering addresses. We then were getting a great deal more cohesion in the operation. At first, we were only assisted by the Japanese linguists...these young men would come and tell us if the messages...if the decodes were reading...and suggest other groups so that maybe we could recover a few more additives. Then we began to have traffic analysis help. A Sergeant McComas became very very effective in traffic analysis; you see by that time, I'm not quite sure of the date, they were not having the indicators in the clear and they weren't having...then they no longer gave the...we call it hatsu and chia....the point of origin and the addressee in the clear. There was an address code ... very simple and a point of origin code, so then, no longer were you able to recognize the sender and the addressee in the clear. So then we had much more assistance. Traffic analysis began to...people began to realize they would know what kind of messages were being sent from a certain point. In our convoys...our water transport convoys... there would be a message asking for air cover for the convoy and a message asking for weather. And you began to realize that when the

convoy was forming, orders were being given, and then there would be the request for the air cover. It might have been from Osaka, but I'm not sure. And then there'd be the request for the weather.

And the weather message I remember was a forty-four group message that became recognizable...I'm sorry I don't know the point of origin, but anyway it was 44 groups.

FARLEY;

Always 44?

O'ROURKE:

Yes, because it was a proforma. And then you... it was very interesting to me...now it is...at the time, we had a traffic analysis group in the next wing. David "Bunky" Schine was one of the traffic analysts and also Gene McCarthy...later senator.


And he would come over with his 44-group message and want that message placed and read so that he could verify that it was the weather message. He had stereotyped groups that you could try, and we were always very good about helping to place it...if we had anything else that would read with that additive, or anything else would go on that overlap, to verify this weather message. If it placed and read it led to the proforma being recovered. It became routine to recognize that weather message...and the aircover message. You began to assemble all the surrounding information around that convoy.

FARLEY:

They were all in the same system? All the messages were in the same system?

O'ROURKE:

Yes, because, you see, that was the system they were using to get their information. So we had the beginnings of a good traffic analysis complex. Bob Benjamin...and others formed



big traffic analysis group...Jack Connelly, Herb Conley, Ted Squire, and Ray Bell, and several others of them became...and Norm Boardman...became very, very competent traffic analysts...they built the whole concept of traffic analysis. I'm sure that by late '44 they had built a good traffic analysis capability. Then with the people on the address groups...there were... was support...much support. For the cryptanalysts there was machine support and Dave Wagner used to work on the theory of probability to aid the readers using the IBM section...the machine section...aids. By that time the Japanese...using a square... The indicator group was enciphered using a square, and consequently, the encipherment was going through a square and the squares lasted 12 days...11 days...there were periods. Because of limitations of the square, there was denial...there was an element of denial, a certain cipher could never go to a certain plain group, based on the qualities of, or the characteristics of, the square. Based on those denials, Dave, with his probabilities, made it possible for us to have machine overlaps, one deep, because of the denials. You would get back from IBM, or from the machine room, a one-deep overlap with maybe four and five groups under each code value, four or five values under each code group, and you could run along and make a message up by selecting words that seemed to go together. Well, that was not, not really ideal, because you could make a message. M

FARLEY:

You could force any message.

O'ROURKE:

Yes, but that was an extremely good tool when you were reading a message to give you assistance along the way, that was extremely good. Through this probability and this system of denials, it really offset the disadvantage of having the use of the squares, and it worked out finally very well when the squares would change. The night that they would change, Bill Lutwiniak and Paul Derthick, would \$1t in them they were sergeants, they would sit in the head house all night, and with three or four messages, try to reconstruct the square, and in the morning Dave Kinney would come in and with 120010 messages, construct the square, and there was always such enormously tense rivalry to see if Bill and Paul could reconstruct the square with the very limited amount of traffic before Dave could get in and build it, you see, with more traffic. We went through that over and over but it was all very me every body was always very enthused about it, and the new square would be dittoed up and out within the day, we would be working with it within a matter of hours.

FARLEY:

Helen, when you finished your overlaps, you passed them to the translators and they peeled off the messages and....

O'ROURKE:

Yes...

FARLEY:

....they were typed up and sent to G-2?

O'ROURKE:

Yes, umhum, that's right.

FARLEY:

What happened to those that you couldn't complete? Those overlaps that were not completable...that you couldn't finish?

O'ROURKE:

They were held there.

FARLEY:

Were they given to another group?

O'ROURKE:

Oh yes, oh yes, yes, oh yes, that's right, what am I saying? ome of the people would strip off the easily recovered groups and then you would hand them to Raymond VanHouten or to Joan Malone Callahan, or somebody who would just do amazing recovery to get that done. They would be very persistent, and sooner or later, they'd get the overlap. can't remember, it whem it went from manual recovery to machine recovery, I can't remember whether they picked up those incomplete overlaps. Partial recoveries counted, of course, and then perhaps...I can't remember now whether they made a big effort to recover the rest of the additive of course, all recovered additive was used, but I can't remember whether they persisted with the resistant ones... I think that they may have later when they were machining everything, but at the time withere was ANAL the idea was to get what you could as fast as you could, and rather than struggling over one that you couldn't complete, the idea was to get another one and recover more additive. But I think later they cleaned them up.

FARLEY:

O'ROURKE:

Helen, was this too early for the use of any captured Japanese code books?

No, I can remember the first part of 2, 4, 6, 8, they had captured

the book finally. And I can remember Sam Chew's saying that the value

he had assigned OXYGEN was really OZONE, A When he chacked his reoveries

against the captured code. And it was a one-part code, and I

remember his checking the captured book, so that was probably

late...probably into '44.

FARLEY:

That's about right.

O'ROURKE:

Umhum. 118hl

FARLEY:

Do you want to take your break now?

O'ROURKE:

Yes.

FARLEY:

I think we've probably discussed pretty much the working on the overlap. Shall we talk about the organization? I'd like you to try to define the relative position of your element in the overall organization structure, if you can recall.

O'ROURKE:

Well, we were in B2, which was the general cryptanalytic...no, which was the Japanese Army problem...cryptanalysis...of the Signal Security Agency.

FARLEY:

Was it Signal Security then?

O'ROURKE:

SSA at this time. And we were assigned the Water Transport problem.

Our section was B2C3, which was one of the elements of B 2. The Japanese diplomatic would have been B3, under Mr. Rowlett, and B2 was under Dr. Kullback. As B2C3, we were the Water Transport problem, as opposed to the army ground problem...other problems...Lieutenant, Seidenglanz was the OIC, and Transport.

FARLEY:

What units did you have?

O'ROURKE:

This was in 1943.

FARLEY:

Okay.

O'ROURKE:

December, and then under that we had the Reading unit, under Raymond VanHouten, and I believe he was there because he was one of the best analysts we had, and Jethro Meek and Jim Miller were there, and then we had the current message units...Lieutenant Sol Bloom and Jack Russell and Lieutenant LaSalle. Records unit was Paul

Pollison,

Deafenbaugh, ininformation unit was Miss Rollins, and the coordination unit, and Lieutenant Freytag was the personnel officer. The coordination unit was charged with handling the assignment of the overlaps, the control of the overlaps, really the arranging for people to work on the overlaps.

FARLEY:

How did you happen to work your way up to that? They just picked you out?

O'ROURKE:

I don't know. For one thing, we were on three shifts, and sometimes

I would stay late from the day shift and know what the swing shift

ought to pick up as matters of priority, and I think it evolved from

having people say, "What's next," or say, "What should they do next;

what was there to do?" And then I took care of all of the overlaps,

but I worked right with Raymond VanHouten. When you asked

if there was a priority, yes there was. I realize now...I'm thinking

about it that we would explain to people what overlaps contained messages

that people wanted read, and we would assign the overlaps, and they

were assigned on three shifts, you see, and the people on the swing

shift would....

FARLEY:

So they never got cold, did they?... The overlaps?

O'ROURKE:

That's right. Some people had their own, of course, but if there were something that would be necessary to work out, we would take that one and ask somebody else to work on it. People hated that...they did not want somebody to work out their overlap. Once set up, once going, they wanted to finish their own overlap.

FARLEY:

Certain possessiveness, or pride?



O'ROURKE:

Well, they were thinking in terms of the messages. They were ready to go on with more of the stereotypes and, besides that, if they had one well started, it was going to be easier to finish, and then when we got into the production phase, they could recover more additives, whereas if they had to start a new one, they would be back to ground zero and that would sort of detract from their record in a way, But mostly it was a case of knowing who was working on which overlap, so that you knew, you see, if you were recovering a book of additives, 10x10 pages, 100 pages to the book, you knew where you were in the book; you knew whether you'd recovered the book of additives, or where you were. There had to be a certain bookkeeping to see where we were in the recovery of this material. If, for instance, you had only one more overlap to do to get the book of 100 pages, you'd try to get that out so that you could send the full 100 pages of additive to the machine room. And so this really consisted of being sure that everybody's overlap was recorded, fromthat everybody knew what everybody was working on, also that aids were there, codebooks were there, new changes, You see, on three shifts, you'd have to inform them of what had happened; to see that they all had new materials or whatever it was that was being developed during one shift or another. Everybody didn't have too long an overlap between shifts...half hour, and that wasn't a long time to explain maybe the events of a whole day. And the key recovery the square recovery units would pass out squares; you had to be sure that there were enough for everybody and people knew what was going on, and be sure that

material that was completed was passed on. I remember once that
Raymond VanHouten said that it was important that I could somehow
influence people to do overlaps that they didn't want to do, just by
saying that we needed them, you see. Anyway, you see, when
you had obscure code groups and obscure patterns of text, it was very
difficult to work out the additive. But anyway, we were weerybody was
enthused, and for once, there was success. You could recover the
additive and the messages would read, and there was product,
and I have since read that this...oh, Dr. Sinkov came by on a visit, and
said that he considered that this was really a great contribution...the Water
Transport, because, these transports were transporting the oil
and when the Japanese Empire was deprived of oil, that was a terrific
contribution to ending the war.

FARLEY:

He came back from Australia?

O'ROURKE:

This was recently that he came by ... oh, this was very recently.

FARLEY:

Oh, it wasn't in '44?

O'ROURKE:

Oh no, no he came by and saw some of the material we had declassified, and remembered it, and we were pleased. Of course, they were working on it in Australia, too. And he remembered, and he was interested in seeing what had been declassified.

FARLEY: .

Helen, the morale problem....some of these little girls probably got pretty bored writing figures in boxes for months on end. Did you have any problem counseling them, or did you have to?

TOP SECRET //ST

O'ROURKE:

I wasn't the counselor. We had a marvelous...we had two wonderful people. We had Betty Cate Edmondson, who was a marvelous woman from Texas. And she was athletic and handsome and completely charming, and nobody could resist her, and she didn't have much time for pettiness. She had a very easy, big way about handling things. You didn't stay petty too long around her. And then there was Norman Dillinger, or Dillinger, we called him "Dilly." He was small and round and he had bright shirts, and he was the counselor. I don't know what...his job wasn't, but he was the one that people talked to, and that he counseled into standing for unpleasantness or whatever they didn't like...and straightening some things out. But one of the best things about personnel then was that they were part of us. Personnel people had worked at the desks or were working at the desks, and they understood what we were doing, and there was none of this separation between management and the people at the desks working. We were all part of a group, and even when Tom O'Brien got to be the personnel man and Dubberstein....Waldo Dubberstein got to be a personnel official. They had all been analysts... "Mo" Klein...they'd all been analysts, and so when you had a personnel problem or you wanted some help from personnel, you didn't have to explain what you were doing, your problem became understandable, very quickly, to them, because they knew. I think now in the Agency, they don't understand what's going on at an analytic point, too well. But, I thought...oh we had disgruntlement. We had all sort of problems which are awfully unimportant right now. We had a young Lieutenant who demanded that we line the desks up. He drew a little chalk line. His name was "Punky" Saunders.... "Punky" Saunders

and his father ran "Piggley Wiggley". And he would have us line up the desks with chalk marks. And you see, we were largely civilian women, and that didn't work well at all. And I think there were times that his life was rather miserable, because they didn't appreciate some of his orders. And then we had a very young Lieutenant who would say to a group of these people, "All right, girls, police this area," and for a lot of the people, it didn't even mean anything. Anyway, there was a certain amount of resistance to military orders, and we had a lovely woman working with us whose husband was a general. She wanted to contribute, and she wore her husband's rank into the office, and she intimidated these new lieutenants. Then we had another wife of a general, VanDevere, who didn't do anything like that...who was just as mild and humble and sweet as anybody ever was and didn't ever indicate that she was special. They lived at the Wardman Park and they were friends with Mrs. Eisenhower, and It was interesting, because they were fine...they went to lunch with us and worked very hard...worked very hard...and I thought that was good for them to do. And they felt they should...their husbands were away and they felt they should do something to contribute, and they did. They were fine, but 7all we had ... We had WACs and we had these ... some people called them "J Boysy". I don't know whether that was very nice, but they were the Japanese students...the Ivy League men, and the men had not come prepared to be corporals, T5s. They had come prepared to be officers running the war, and they were very...General Hershey was the one that had engineered the recruitment, and then you see, they weren't getting their promotions. And they were over in the barracks; they didn't care to live

in the barracks, and one of their sergeants in charge of them was Bill Lutwiniak and I remember that they felt that they just couldn't adjust to that barracks life, but he helped them. I remember when he returned from the China-Burma-India Theater, they had a lovely party for They were terribly fond of him...all of them. They worked for him. Colonel Reichalber. ... Edwin Reichauer, and when Mr. Reichauer was made Ambassador to Japan, they wrote a lovely round-robin letter, mall of them wrote, and it was a very pleasant group. They got to be very, very close, wevery good friends. One of those men was Andy Embrye. He was from New Jersey....Princeton, and he is now in the music department at the University of California at Berkley, writing and being very well reviewed in his music....oh, very well...and very prominent. remember that he would sit at a piano at a party and play until anybody stopped requesting. He was a very, very likeable and very tractible person. And he was underweight, and they were going to give these men automatic commissions over in the gymnasium. I suppose that would have been '44. I think there were 40 of them...to get their automatic commissions...field commissions, I suppose, and we were all to go...we were all invited....this all was going to be very wonderful, only we were afraid that Andy Embry wasn't going to make the weight. And this was in the days of rationing, and we brought him chocolate that you couldn't get anywhere. We brought him bananas. We brought him things that you couldn't get easily, and they had ... every girl in the unit tried to get him food...force him to make the weight requirement and he did. And they all got their commissions. They all became Second

Lieutenants. They were a very, very fine group; really fine. And they worked so well for...they had a....of course, they admired Colonel KEIBSCHAUER Reichauer very greatly. Then they had Doug Overton, who was their supervisor, and he was fine, and they had Colonel Aurell, very fine, and the main factor was, nothese were linguists, really good linguists, and you see, they really were good students and they had done the best they could with the books, but they were not really Japanese linguists. And then we had, of course, Dick Faust; we had the Erskines who had learned Japanese; we had Helen Zander who had been there, and Charles Segally, who had been there, in many of them had been brought up in Japan. I believe Dr. Zalock, too, who had lived in Japan. One time I took the trouble on the phone to Colonel Erskine to spell Wokaskan for him, and he, probefore I could finish said, "I grew up there," and so I hadn't realized then that he had...members of his family were there. Mildred worked with us, and...

FARLEY:

This wasn't Hugh Erskine?

O'ROURKE:

Yes.

FARLEY:

Was it Hugh?

O'ROURKE:

Absolutely. I knew Bill Erskine, too, but this was Hugh...he was kind.

But anyway, the lent their knowledge of the language, they were so
agreeable to teaching. They didn't ever turn you away when you needed
a question answered or asked if something would be something that they
should have said...that could have been written. They were so generous
with their teaching that I really feel that we couldn't have had better
help from people, and when we first got there, we came violently angry

TOP SECKET//ST

at everything Japanese...just violently angry, and said terrible things. Miss Zander had been a missionary and she couldn't stand what she was hearing from us, and so one day she had six of us come to her apartment for dinner where she had her beautiful Japanese things, and she had a Japanese dinner, and didn't force us to use chopsticks, but did everything that would be very nice and very agreeable, and talked to us about her friends and about her school in Japan.

(pause)

FARLEY:

This is a follow-up interview with Helen O'Rourke on the...what is today Helen...18th...19th...

O'ROURKE:

18th.

FARLEY:

On the 18th of April. Helen, I have a few more questions that we could follow up on. One concerns a possibilty of any friction between Army personnel and civilians. You mentioned that there was minor rank pulling and rank-happy lieutenants, and this type of...but I mean over and above that. Was there any friction at all? Any major incidents?

O'ROURKE:

I don't think of any. There was a small irritation...a group of civilian... and many were mostly women, who hadn't been ordered around by military people ever and there was a feeling that everybody was equal and there was no reason to observe any special attention because of rank, but even more than that, in everybody was young, reverybody was there to do a job, and there was a great deal of social activity and friendliness. It surmounted the irritations. The people who caused the irritation were

the military people who were trying desperately to make the operation fall in line with military procedure and all of the people...they were... many of those people were property custodians and people who were in charge of...they would be the executive officers...they weren't the people at the desks doing the work, particularly, and there were irritations from time to time. buthrand I saw no friction between the civilian women and the WACS, but the point was we were all working together, and the other part about it was that there was sociability. People had all sorts of get togethers, and you knew them personally; there was no reason to have any kind of an altercation at all. One thing, I think, was that the military were not very military, rumost of them, and futhermore, they had not really intended to have military careers; that was not their aim. As far as we were concerned, we were helping them try to get these commissions that they weren't getting, and we just needed them to help us. We had people who were...for instance, we had a Sergeant Tom Burns, Sergeant Corry Long, some Lieutenants, but they were from colleges; they were basically academic people and they put on the uniform and got there and then did as best they could to go on with the work. Military rules got in their way sometimes, but otherwise, and we real think we had the feeling that there was no difference, really. It was only when almilitary rule was...they attempted to enforce a military rule, nand then there was a little resistance. But, actually, I think Frank Lewis' point was carried through, nif they could help you with the work, and if they were doing good work, there was no reason to have any friction. Everybody was just pulling his load.

FARLEY:

Right. Helen what about the male attitude toward the women insofar as ability and talent? Did the men look down on the gals in those days? Chauvinistic attitude...you know what I mean.

O'ROURKE:

I don't think so. We all started pretty much as neophytes, and then it wasn't very long before the better analysts were certainly known, and then they turned into people you went to for help, They wor you helped them, if they wanted you to try a system or try something that they had thought up. But then people very agreeably would stop what they were doing, mor try to alter what they were doing to test out an idea. Dave Wagner was instrumental in coming around and getting people to help him with some of his plans and theories and Major Dunwell from It seemed to me that there was a great spirit of cooperation. I think people didn't appreciate shiftwork, although we had a group that stayed on graveyard for months. I think that there was a minimum, that is, that I saw, me a minimum of friction. One point of friction came when Captain Seidenglanz and Captain Freytag decided to do a production-type of discipline, but that wasn't aimed at them, because they were military. That was a problem was difficult to handle, because of the way it was done, init wouldn't have mattered who did it. weren't rank conscious, and there were very few promotions, wvery few promotions for civilians, we very few promotions for military. - it was sort of any people weren't planning on the next promotion, or struggling for it, we they were busy working, and because of so many of these young people were T5s and they were extremely good workers and smart and agreeable, it sort of eradicated the rank feelings. They

TOD SECRET//ST

were disappointed at not being officers, but it didn't matter.

FARLEY:

Right. ** Helen, what type of production competition did Seidenglanz and

his people do? So many overlaps, so many additives?

O'ROURKE:

o many additives and additives recovered.

FARLEY:

You were directed to...

O'ROURKE:

No, it was counted. You counted your additives recovered, and I think I explained that it might have been easier to recover a hundred than ten, but I think he tried to develop a weighting system, finally so that they could get credit for some more difficult work, but there was a little problem about that sometimes.

FARLEY:

Helen, let me switch tapes, please.

O'ROURKE:

Umhum.

(End tape 1, side 2)

FARLEY:

O'ROURKE:

This is tape number two for Helen O'Rourke. All right, let's....

Well I was thinking about the male attitute toward the women. They admired, you see, some of these people knew the code groups and could recover additive and could present these men...these translators material to work with better than the men could've done at decryption. At the same time, the people needed them for their language assistance very much, and then further than that, they were all friends. They socialized and they were just very eager to get along. There was a lot of teasing friendliness. One Lieutenant Harrison, had squeaky shoes and he would walk the length of the wing with those squeaky shoes and everybody would top out a little cadence while he walked. You know...it was nothing important, it was just a sort of a unifying act.

FARLEY:

It relieved the tension, too.

O'ROURKE:

Yes. One time two girls came in identical dresses. They work white with big black diagonals, and there was a business of having to walk the length of the wing to get to the front no matter where you were, but these girls walked, during the day, the length of the wing...one of the fellows said to one of them, "Maude, is that dress an original?" After they'd walked down most of the day...things like that. But there was...it was a good spirit...very fine.

FARLEY:

Helen, were some of the women given positions of responsibility later on in the war?

O'ROURKE:

Yes. Oh yes. For instance, Betty Cate Edmondson was made a personnel...

I believe she was one of the directors in personnel. It was very soon that Ann Caracristi and Wilma become chiefs of sections. As time went on, women proceeded on to section chiefs, division chiefs. Carrie Berry, in the traffic analysis, wand Gloria Forbes in traffic analysis. Then in the translation unit, we had Marie Meyer. We had women who became chiefs of sections. In the early days, Millie Lorentz was an assistant to Mr. Dillinger and she was, you might have called her an executive secretary or administrative assistant. She worked with him...time cards... the running of the section...I don't know whether I can....she's in here somewhere. Now for instance, this organization in 1943 of June indicates that Eleanor Bletzo was in charge of records, Miss Enger was in charge of....this was the overlapping where you wrote up the overlaps. And Willie Tirie was the traffic handler and Louise Lewis, who became

Mrs. Paul Derthick and then Mary Jo Dunning. Mary Jo Dunning was always in an executive position, because she had been in one of the early groups down on Constitution Avenue. So these are...women and, of course, Delia Sinkov. All of these people were either in senior analytic positions, advisors, or in supervisory positions. I think there was a... now you see, here's a sergeant, Snyder, in charge and there's Lieutenant set? Hozner working for him. This organization did not follow typical military structure, but it was all...everybody worked.

FARLEY:

Helen, was there any...I don't want to say racial discrimination...Was there any problem with...at the time we called them "colored" people? Were there any blacks hired, or working at Arlington Hall?

O'ROURKE:

Not at the beginning. Not at the beginning. I'm not quite sure which date, but I'm sure by '44 they were there. They came: At first they were char people and people doing the custodial work, then a group was hired and they were doing clerical work...traffic handling...initial handling, or I think they were...some of them were working with IBM and doing the punch card. They were in "A" Building. At the very beginning,

Dr. Julia Ward was one of the people who saw that it was fair that they be there, and she was a voice in their favor everywhere. At first they didn't come to the cafeteria to eat. They brought their own lunches and had their own supper, because they were on the swing shift, and then they were assigned, the more outstanding, the ones that people got to know and admire. Then they were assigned to the regular work in the office, and there were troubles there. There were people who felt that that wasn't proper, but the majority of people happily

worked with them; they were very good. But in Virginia, they couldn't ride in the front of the bus, they couldn't go to local restaurants, they couldn't go to parks, and so if there was to be a party or picnic, it had to be in the office, because the segregation was still very, very emphasized in Virginia. But through their own cooperation and their own excellence and then it was not done through aggravation or through a great staged operation...they were assimilated gradually and on the basis of their work and I believe it was done the smoothest way it could be done, and there was never any conflict that I could see.

FARLEY:

Was it just a "token" force, promi

O'ROURKE:

At first it was a very small force...token...maybe as few as 20, and then, of course, it was enlarged. I'm not sure, but I think that pictures were not required on the applications.

FARLEY:

After that?

some of it.

O'ROURKE:

O'ROURKE:

Umhum.

FARLEY:

Ok. Before that, you had to submit a photograph of yourself?
Yes, umhum, but I think that was one of things that was changed. Later, of course, that was reinstated, but at the time, that was a point. But I think that was very smoothly done, and there were people who worked agreeably with everybody. At the beginning there would be social things you didn't do...there wouldn't be one black and one white person at lunch together. There wouldn't be a table...a mixed table at the beginning. It all evolved, but it wasn't done with any strident statements.

There was no attention to it...great attention to it, it just seemed to evolve. I think Dr. Ward was instrumental in quiding

FARLEY:

Were there any other minority groups working at the Hall that you recall?

I'm speaking of a group...not one or two individuals, but were there any

Puerto Ricans...I guess it was before Puerto Ricans were....

O'ROURKE:

Oh, yes, it was before that. I don't think of any. If there were, anybody who had Japanese background, they were honored people, I tell you, because we needed them badly.

FARLEY:

Were there some Japanese people there? People who had lived...I mean who were Japanese nationals who lived in the U.S. for years and years and years....were really loyal Americans?

O'ROURKE:

I don't remember. I don't remember any. I don't remember. The nearest we got would be the returned missionaries. I don't remember any, at all. That would have been very bad, because we had a terrible attitude. We were angry and fighting.

FARLEY:

You talked about...just before we switched off yesterday, talking about the dinner party you went to and the lady talked about chopsticks...

I don't think you finished that. Would you mind finishing that story?

Well, the result of all that was that we grew to understand much, much better that these were fine people. It also helped us follow the lead of some of these people in knowing how the Japanese people thought, which helped us in reading messages. It was very easy then for them to say, "Oh, they wouldn't say that," or "They didn't mean that." And it was easier for them to explain to us what a message was probably saying. We understood much better about the people...the way they lived, and some of their ideals. I think she did a great service, really. Then

we were able to talk to others. We talked to Mr. Legally and we talked

O'ROURKE:

to some of the other people who were then also able to help us to understand how things had been, and I think it was very valuable that we were able to really drop some of the, I suppose it would be the provincial midwest attitude.

FARLEY:

How about the people who had men in the service and who were over fighting the Japanese in the islands? Did they ever change their attitude or were they still adamant against the Japanese? Do you ever remember a situation like that?

O'ROURKE:

We all changed some. Then it became...well, of course, our targets were these transports, and there was no question that we were aiming to destroy them, if we could, to help to destroy the targets. However, the people who had men in battle, Werre were fighting an enemy, K a far-distant enemy. They were more concerned with their own conditions, their own danger to their own lives, the terrible conditions that they were living under. Yes, there were bad remarks about the Japanese, but I think there was a much more personal feeling about the trouble that the members of the family were going through. We had a friend who was engaged to a corporal in Leyte. And we heard the letters, and it was mostly whether he had enough to eat, how bad the situation was physically, If he had to march so far, or was deprived of...well, I guess some of it was the rain, Asome of it was another were the kinds of things that would be written in a letter home that we were hearing from these people. I don't think that...some how or other, our common enemy wasn't as real as it could have been, because we were so busy subtracting numbers and getting messages that would read. I

remember there was one operator, who made errors and didn't change the code when he was supposed to, and I remember when they read that he had transferred from that unit...there was a general feeling that he should have had a commendation from the....

FARLEY:

You mean a Japanese operator?

O'ROURKE:

A Japanese operator, because he had provided people with a lot of help.

FARLEY:

Yeah, he helped us, right.

O'ROURKE:

And so there was a feeling that...there was a closeness about it, and I think that we were too busy to really be good historians about what was happening.

FARLEY:

Helen, you've covered this already, but I have a question about the general dedication of the workers. Would you like to say anymore on that?

O'ROURKE:

It was wonderful. It was really wonderful. They did their level best, and I don't think I heard any remarks about raises for the first year. I don't think money was...I don't think salaries...I don't think position in grade...I don't think any of that was one of the talked about items. They were very busy getting whatever they could done. Now there's where the war entered in, because obviously the idea was to help win the war. Right. Helen, did you ever hear the word, ULTRA, when you were working,

FARLEY:

or what was the classification of the material on which you were working?

Do you remember any of the...?

O'ROURKE:

It was all SECRET, but I don't remember applying a codeword. I don't ever remember that. The security factor was pour didn't say one word about what you did. You didn't talk to people in another wing about what you did. There wasn't a great deal of exchange.

O'ROURKE:

TOP SECRET//SI

You didn't talk to people. But it was SECRET, in the sense of it was SECRET. There were no stamps on the overlaps. Maturathey were worksheets, but, of course, the product was classified, but we didn't see the product.

FARLEY: We had codewords in those days, didn't we, wa TOP SECRET CODEWORD?

Yes, we had words like PINUP and THUMB and PEARL. The first word was

CREAM and that was well after, I think CREAM was '46.

FARLEY: So the general use of codewords started after '46?

O'ROURKE: Umhum, in agreement, you see, after the UK agreement. ULTRA was primarily

used in Europe and for our product, no our summaries, MAGIC was the word

used in the Pacific, although there were times that ULTRA would be applied.

I think MAGIC was never applied in Europe. I think ULTRA, at times, would

be applied. We had codewords to indicate the level of the analysis, for

instance, THUMB, PEARL, PINUP, indicating grades of whether it would be

derived through traffic analysis or through cryptanalysis low-level crypt.

Those words were dropped to....after 1946, then the codewords were used

and I think CREAM was the first TOP SECRET codeword.

FARLEY: Good.

O'ROURKE: But I... to tell you the truth, then... I don't even remember at that...

that we were aware of codewords. We were just aware that it was all

SECRET.

FARLEY: Right, right. Helen you mentioned Britain, and it comes to mind...did

we have any integrated analysts from Great Britian or Australia or

Canada who were working side-by-side with our people at Arlington Hall?

O'ROURKE: Not in '43...not in '44...not in our section.

FARLEY: During the war at all?

O'ROURKE:

Well, I don't know. I don't think so. It was, I think in '45 or '46 that there was a British officer who joined them.

FARLEY:

And a Dutch officer?

O'ROURKE:

Oh, and Vercail was there, but that was later. That was...let me see... no, Mr. Peterson and Mr. Vercail....I think '44. I think they would have been there in '44, but I didn't see them. I saw Joseph Peterson, but I don't know where Vercail went, or if he were in the building.

FARLEY:

So you weren't aware of any at that time?

O'ROURKE:

No, no. In fact, at that time, I wasn't aware that there was any cooperation anywhere, but right where we were. And the only reason I knew about people who were away was that Delia Sinkov's husband was in Australia; you see, that's how simple it all was to us. It was just that we knew her husband was in Australia.

FARLEY:

Did you see any input from Central Bureau in Australia or did they feed any additives in to you people, or was there any cooperation of any type?

O'ROURKE:

They did, but not to us where we were, at our tables, but they did to the people who were working in the headhouses like Sinkov and Lutwiniak and those people; they were also constructing squares and they were also doing decrypting, and they were working on the water problem. The Water transport problem, but we didn't know this. When information came to us that we needed it, it was brought to us from the front office. We weren't informed as to where it came from. It didn't matter. They just brought it to us. I was not aware of what the accomplishments had been until well after the war, and I got to know Joe Richards and it was Joe Richards...it was after that.

FARLEY: Helen, did you ever hear of any possible compromises or the attempt at

enemy penetration among the ranks of the analysts where you worked or

anyplace else in the building?

O'ROURKE: At one point, they thought that security was not strict enough. And

I believe it was ordered from the Pentagon. Two WACS came through,

got badges. We had button badges, and people would put the button

badge on an outer coat and then if they'd go to hang up the coat while

they were at lunch, the badge stayed on the coat.

FARLEY: They were not picture badges?

O'ROURKE: Yes, they were.

FARLEY: They were picture badges?

O'ROURKE: Yes, round, button picture badges, and these WACS picked up two badges

and came in and selected items from different people's deskin you see,

people evidentally at lunch, had not covered everything up...put every-

thing away...and assembled a representative pile of materials that were

classified, They were SECRET, and that episode was used to indicate

that people had to be more secure.

FARLEY: That was not fair, was it, really?

O'ROURKE: Well....

FARLEY: Wasn't that considered, generally considered, a secure area behind the

barbed wire fence?

O'ROURKE: Yes, but we were never to be separated from our badges.

FARLEY: Ok, it was the badge bit, all right.

O'ROURKE: And, you see, anybody could have picked that badge up off that coat.

TOP SHERREY//SI

FARLEY:

It was the badge, all right.

O'ROURKE:

Yes, however, also, people should have piled their materials in a secure fashion anyway. It called attention to a growing relaxation that they wanted to tighten up. I, oh, now this is later, when I got to know Bill Weisband, but this was later. At that time, I didn't have any knowledge or feeling of anybody trying to obtain information on what we were doing. I think, at the very beginning, we thought nobody knew about it. We hadn't known. We weren't telling and I think we had the secure feeling that nobody knew what was going on. We didn't even say worked at Arlington Hall. We didn't say what we did, and I think that we just didn't imagine that anybody else knew. Very, very naive... we were very uneducated in the whole business of SIGINT at the time. We were all just brand new, and we were just trying...everybody was just working. It was a nice atmosphere.

FARLEY:

You started to tell about an incident with Weisband.

O'ROURKE:

Oh, Bill Weisband?

FARLEY:

Weisband, yeah.

O'ROURKE:

Well, that was later.

FARLEY:

Do you want to recite that, or is it ...?

O'ROURKE:

Yes, to go from all this many them, just before the end of the war, no it was '45, they had to break down the section, disperse the employees; many people left. I was hired for the duration of the war and six months, and it had gotten to be two years by then. Then the idea was to reassign people where they would be needed, and at that time, the section working on Russian, a Soviet traffic, may was the most secret section, and Mary Jo

TOP SECRET//SI EO 3.3b(3)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3609

Dunning, who had been one of the supervisory people and had known my work, ran interference for me: They looked into my background, saw where my parents were born, and that sort of thing. I was evidentally cleared to go into this Russian section under Bill Smith. Mary Jo Dunning was working in there, and at that time, they were working on AMTORG, the American Trading Organization Russian Traffic, and Cecil Phillips was brand new and very young, and was working very hard to locate reuse of additive. This again was an additive recovery problem, and the Soviet traffic was processed, primarily by Ann Kitchens, Gloria Forbes, and that group. . and Carrie Berry, and there was a Russian military system, the section was headed by Suzanne Smith. This was readable. ..it was readable, and it was being processed...it was an additive system, too. and I remember for years we saved the traffic It was a terrific storage problem.

it was about '46, I was working again with the coordinating. We had a

We worked on that and then, I think

EO 3.3b(3) EO 3.3b(6) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

system of reporting the status of every system we were working, para monthly status report. We were compiling that, and I was working with... I think by this time it was AFSA-242. I was working with Ed Christopher, when from England came these big shipments of materials that was TICOM. These were captured materials, paraterials that had been obtained through the work of special teams, pare American/British cooperating teams in Europe. A collection of materials that they got...SIGINT-related materials. We would unpack the boxes, record the material, as far as we could, of they were identified, get them to the people who were working on them, so whatever we could do to equate or to identify the material, as they might relate to the work we were doing. We were successful in a couple of places. Very handily successful. Then there was another

So we had

48

EO 3.3b(3) EO 3.3b(6) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

and I think that back here....We haven't finished talking about the badges and the security...I moved ahead. We had security lectures all the time. Sometimes they weren't formal lectures or printed exhortations. They would gather a group together and explain again...most of the time

there would be new people coming in...have to be indoctrinated and have to be read into the problems, and again you'd be told what the rules were and I think it was...I'm not sure, but that it was the end of the war before we were to allowed to say what our job had been.

FARLEY:

Really?

O'ROURKE:

I think so, and the security was that you could not possibly endanger the lives of these people who were overseas fighting, and you couldn't endanger the success you were having on these systems. At the time I don't think I knew who would be a recipient of the information. I don't think I had any idea where people would be that would be able to use the information, but I knew enough to know that it was not to be released.

FARLEY:

Helen, you mentioned earlier that people didn't talk to each other, if you had a friend in another element, so the need-to-know principle was rigidly enforced?

O'ROURKE:

Yes, yes. For instance, at four o'clock in the morning we would go downstairs and have coffee. A plantage sergeant downstairs made coffee. We'd go down the back stairs, have coffee, and we would bring donuts. There might have been eight of us doing this, and we never knew what he did. I never knew what section he was in. I never knew what they did. That might have been that I didn't ask around, but I don't think any of us...we weren't concerned, and he worked for Frank Steinmetz, and it was year or so...years later that I learned that they were printing the bulletins. I didn't have any idea. And we didn't talk, you see at the time, we had all come from either

teaching or college, and we had other things to talk about, and we didn't discuss the work, because we were told not to. That was part of it, and I know, as I told you, when we began to get help from other wings, from the people in the wings, we were told that we were to talk to them. It was laid on that we were to talk to them to get this help.

FARLEY:

Helen, a badge would get you into the gate and into any building in the area. Where there any compartments, is what I'm saying...any places where you were not permitted to enter?

O'ROURKE:

Oh, yes. We all had red badges with our pictures, and there were so many of us. We were whithe whole second floor practically and we didn't really need to go anywhere else. We would go over to "A" building to the machine section, we knew who to talk to there, we could come back. A there was now. I can't remember anybody saying where you couldn't go. There were people downstairs who were working on the JMA, the dip. We knew that they were B-3. We knew some of the people who were there. We knew that they were working on Japanese. We didn't have to talk to them. didn't seem to be any....they didn't need to know what we knew, and they didn't care, and we didn't seem to need to know what they were doing, and it was a long time later that I learned what they were doing....a long Now that may be just my personal attitude, and I'm sure that there were many people in the building who needed to discuss what they were doing with people, but for the general people at the table, there was no In fact, need.

as I think of it, I don't remember a library. I don't remember that we had not that I think of it, we got a lot of information from these returned missionaries. They were very fine about helping us, and I'm sure that we had reference books in the wing. We had geography books and maps and dictionaries. We had whatever dictionaries anybody could bring in, but for a library of collateral history, or anything like that, I don't remember that we had it, at all. I don't think we used collateral much.

FARLEY:

The general color was red. For instance, could a personnel representative come into B Group and talk to somebody?

O'ROURKE:

Oh, they were part of us.

FARLEY:

Ok.

O'ROURKE:

They were a part of us. There would be Tom O'Brien or Betty...or Dilly...

Norman Dillinger. They were a part of the group, yes. There were other colored badges for custodial people, but ..., and provided it know where we couldn't go. I know where we couldn't do any were didn't know anything about it, and that was COMSEC. I had a friend who was very close because of our association in this course, who went to work at COMSEC, and I didn't know where her room was. Widn't know was her telephone number; I could get to her. She never said what she did. One day, when she first started, she said, "You know, we're breaking American codes," and that only interested me mildly at that point. I think we'd all been there a month or two. That was the last I heard. That was the last she ever told what she did, and I saw her often.

FARLEY:

Where were they physically located at Arlington Hall?

O'ROURKE:

They were in An Building, and Maxine Devours, with braids around her head, she was there. And this girl that I know, was from Louisiana, and she was part of a family who had a great deal of money....oil. And she had never been on her own before in her life, and she was determined that she was going to live on her salary, which was very small. We were very close to her. We were with her all the time. She was reduced sometimes to eating a candy bar at the end of a pay period, because she had spent all her money. She had gone to concerts, mashe had done everything she wanted to do, and we were very disturbed for her, then she went to Roslynn and tried to get a loan.

FARLEY:

(end Tape 2, side 1)

FARLEY:

in he wanted to get a loan, and what?

O'ROURKE:

She had a mink coat on when she went down to get the loan, and we told her that she had no business in Roslynn at these loan places, and we marched her to Betty Cate Edmondson, who was the personnel lady, and whe had no money, wishe really didn't have any money. She was out of food and we, of course, all offered, but we didn't have a lot of money either, but on the other hand, we were all ready to help her, but she was going to show this great independence and not take charity, and they wouldn't give her a loan at our place. Where was a small welfare loan that would tide people over temporarily,

because people came from home and didn't have their money in order, but they wouldn't was remember that they wouldn't give her a loan, because they knew the circumstances of her family, and they were not sympathetic with her aim to be independent. So we all chipped in. I always remember that, because she did learn that she had to live differently, but see, everybody was new. Everybody was away from home. Circumstances were just not like a college or being at home. I remember that I went...she was a friend of Senator Elender, very good friends, see, they were all in oil, and we went to his apartment in the LaSalle building and he was so lovely and gracious, wso marvelous, and we were quite naive and young. It was lovely...it was a lovely meeting, but it was a...oh, she didn't tell him that she didn't have any money, and, of course, we didn't either, of course, but it was a...she finally got an apartment and was living the way she ought to have. But that was one of the things that ... and we all helped ... we all did what we could do, and liked each other.

FARLEY:

Sure, it was fun.

O'ROURKE:

Sure, it was a...very strange, and there were many things that people learned to do that were free....concerts, and somebody would discover what they could do. Many of us used to go to the art gallery Sunday nights, because there was a very good cafeteria in the National Art Gallery -- Mellon, and then there was a concert. Many of us went there Sunday nights. It was a low-key existence, really...picnics, and mostly work...mostly work.

FARLEY: Helen did you ever get a chance to visit any of the intercept sites, or...

O'ROURKE: Never.

FARLEY: Nebraska avenue, or the school down in the....?

O'ROURKE: Not then. I did later...

FARLEY: Later on...

O'ROURKE: Never, never. We didn't even know...we knew about Vint Hill. We all

knew about Vint Hill, because the military people had been at Vint

Hill for a period of training, and they came from Vint Hill. But

we didn't know what all they did at Vint Hill, but we knew that these

people came from Vint Hill. We knew about Nebraska Avenue, because Mary

Jo Dunning would tell us, and there were times when there were discussions

about the translations...the Navy versus the Army. There were discrepancies

in people's concept of how the thing should go. Mary Jo told me about

this, muthat there was such conflict that they evolved the system of having

the Army do the ... even-odd days ... Army and Navy doing part of the time.

We didn't know anybody from there. They didn't was that doesn't mean that

the people in charge didn't, but there was nobody who came to look at what

we were doing at our, well, of course, we were working on the Water Transport,

and there was nobody over there doing that exact job, so there was no need

and the state of t

to discuss with them what we were doing. We knew they were over there,

but we...

FARLEY: No liaison, at all, then?

O'ROURKE: Well, of course, not at our level.

FARLEY: Oh, yes.

O'ROURKE:

Not at our level. When you were talking about...we were encouraged to notify personnel or our supervisors if we saw anything unusual or strange. Well, we got this little girl to personnel. Actually I never did know what all of the badges entitled people to do. We knew our badges, and I don't think we ever...we were very busy, very involved, and I don't think we ever had any...I don't think we knew what there was there to be interested in. We just worked.

FARLEY:

That's true.

O'ROURKE:

And we were never briefed on what they were doing. I would never have known what that outfit did in "A" building if she, if this girl, hadn't said the first day. I didn't even have any idea of what they did. I was going to tell you about VJ day.... VE day.... such a celebration as you can't imagine. Everybody just had such a marvelous celebration; it was fine, but VJ day, as you very well know the story, because of the Sam Snyder's report, we had...downstairs in the B3, they had the message that....the surrender message...the message detailing the surrender, and it was being translated by John Hurt and I don't know the name of the lady that was doing the decrypting, and it was not, you see, for publication, and if you think that that was one time when the need-toknow prevailed, the word went through that building unbelievably fast. And then the word went out that, I think there was a delay of....a small time-delay...before they got it absolutely translated, and I think they had to get a confirmation message, because there were some garbles, and then they cut off the black phones, so that we couldn't phone out, and we were not dismissed, well, of course, it wasn't time to go, but nobody was dismissed early and no black phones!

FARLEY: Was this on August 12th or whatever the date was? Was that the final surrender or was that a preliminary message indicating that we're

getting ready?

O'ROURKE:

Oh, it was the final.

FARLEY:

Oh, it was?

O'ROURKE:

It was the final time, because when we got home, you see, when they let us...when we finally got home, then the announcement had been made.

FARLEY:

Oh, okay.

O'ROURKE:

And then, you see, people celebrated. But I always remember that there was no way that people could phone out, and an advance notice.

FARLEY:

I'll be darned.

O'ROURKE:

I thought that was very smart. Wery fine. And then there was this tremendous celebration. It was just tremendous, but then, you see, there had to be the draw down, and the reassignment, and a lot of people...many, many actually left. They had come for the war; they had stayed, and they had done what they had intended to do. A great many of the young men, who were these new lieutenants...well, they weren't so new...went back, either to their academic training or to their work...lawyers...whatever they were doing. They went back to their college or to work. That was not to be their career there. Many left. There were farewell parties that you wouldn't believe, because so many really did go. Then for the people who were staying, they had to...well, they had to close down the operation.

FARLEY:

Was there any attempt to continue it on a skeleton basis?

O'ROURKE:

Oh, -yeah.

FARLEY:

Or just completely closed up?

O'ROURKE:

Oh, no, no...it, oh yes, there were people still cleaning up...doing these things that weren't finished. And then there was the burn bag detail. I just...the cleaning by burnbagging of...you can see that we...worksheets were not saved. The final translation was saved, but in many cases, the original traffic was not saved. The translation was saved, and there was a paper surplus and lots of people...the instructions were there, what to destroy and what to save, and the burnbagging was quite a terrible detail. Everybody hated...two or three days of it.

FARLEY:

And they burned all that material, didn't they? It was not pulped or...?

O'ROURKE:

No, what was burned was stirred and burned, yes.

FARLEY:

Yeah, right.

O'ROURKE:

Yes. But then people had to be reassigned. I think that the Japanese diplomatic group worked longer. I think that this Water Transport folded very early. One of the early ones. And the Army and the Dip, I think, extended longer. But that's when I went to the Russian section, and there was security.

FARLEY:

Helen, could I ask you how long were you aware that Russian traffic was being read? Or that there was an effort against the Russian problem?

O'ROURKE:

I think the day they asked me to go to the section, was the first.

FARLEY:

They had not been working on the Soviet problem?

O'ROURKE:

Oh, they had worked that...oh, they had been working, but we didn't know. They were in the back of a wing. They didn't enter from the front of the wing. There was another group at the front of the wing. The people working on the Russian problem came through another wing, across the crosswalk to the back. The front of the wing was another section. The front of the wing didn't know what the people in the back were working on. It was, you see, this was the day of lend-lease, this was the day of friendship.

FARLEY:

Yes.

O'ROURKE:

There was no indication that that's what they were working on. There was no linguist talking to us. There was no idea. And when I was talked to about it, I was told that it was the most secret of anything, and only people with native American parents and all sorts of security restrictions were observed in employing anybody there.

And by that time, by the time I got there, there was a full wing... earlier, and that was '45.

FARLEY:

So do you think we were working on it during the entire war? Working on the Soviet problem?

O'ROURKE:

I just can't say. Certainly before I got there. Certainly before the end of the war, but I can't say. I had some files, oh yes, there were some files in the bottom drawer, it was TRP "The Russian Problem," and there were indications that there had been an effort. And it was called BOURBON, and I imagine that it had been covered to a degree. I have no idea how long.



FARLEY:

Were they working on all type systems, or were they selective about them?

O'ROURKE:

The first one was the AMTORG, that In.

FARLEY:

You mentioned it, yes.

O'ROURKE:

mand then there was the military, and there was a two-digit system that they were working, **ma little governmental system.

FARLEY:

That's unusual, yeah.

O'ROURKE:

Yes, they did that. Yes, by the time I got there, there were several systems. The one I worked on was the AMTORG, and that was the

Later, after we had some help from the TICOM,

I'm going to lose years, but I think that would have been '46...

maybe '46 or '47 that they would have done that. Then when we began

to use the TICOM material, that became a whole effort. The Russian...

the TICOM material that applied to the southern Europeans...any Rumanian-Buffam

Czech-Polish material was sent over to "A" Building. Benson Buffam was

in charge. For the people...the things that came to us, Ed Christopher

was in charge of record keeping and placing the material where it would

be used. It was a great deal of support for traffic analysis. They

had done a great deal of traffic analysis, and then one of the most

useful things we had were the results of the interrogations of these

was it a combined suggestion? The establishment of the and, remember that?

O'ROURKE:

I don't know. You know,

I would almost suggest that it came from there.

The people involved in it on our side were Norm Boardman, Don Borrman, Herb

Conley, that whole group in the TA, and the actual cards, with

TOP SECRET//SI

	would have rather suggested
	but I think maybe
	the use of the cards and the machining of the information might have
	come from here. I think Phil Patton and that group had a great deal to
	do with that.
FARLEY:	Proved extremely helpful later on.
O'ROURKE:	Oh my, yes, and then, of course, it was too. You see,
	it became provided everywhere. It still is, of course. All reporting
	became more formalized. MA reporting was a Everything became more
	structured.
FARLEY:	Serialized, theand the:?EO 3.3b(3) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
O'ROURKE:	Everything, yes, yes, all the systems
FARLEY:	and
O'ROURKE:	And all the interim reports and all the status reports and routine
	reporting, everything then became formalized and structured, and that:
	was good, Arwas Anand coordinated.
	all coordinated and useful systems, amazingly long
	longstanding systemsthe whole idea was filled with wisdom; in fact,
	the procedures, I'm sure, are used basically today, too.
FARLEY:	Right, Helen, how many people are you talking about in '46 that moved
	in to work on the Russian problem? After the war?
O'ROURKE:	Oh, probably 30-35.
FARLEY:	Not hundreds? Well, that came later, I suppose.

TOD SECDET / ST

O'ROURKE:

Yes, Kidon think sister was working on the Japanese problem, and she went to work in the section. They were spread over.

I think maybe between 30 and 50.

FARLEY;

Was it? So the primary effort then was...Soviet problem, Japanese problem, and all other problems...the French problem, or all others?

O'ROURKE:

Oh veah, oh French was very active, and Italian, French, Czech, Polish. They had all of the group over in "A" Building, and one of the big sections was French....Paul Hartstoll. That was one of the big ones. Well, anyway, after the TICOM material, you see, the TICOM was a joint Army....British-American Army activity, because, of course, it was a ground activity at the conclusion of hostilities it would be a ground element that would go through to pick up this SIGINT oriented material and all the TICOM people were SIGINTers and they all knew what they were looking for and they were in teams, acquiring this material and, insofar as they could, talking to the people. I think many of the interrogations took place in England. I think most of them did. They were where have learned since that the Russians got some better people than we did, I quess, but one of the things that was very interesting was that the Russians had planned ahead on some of this, and this is described in Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle. They had a teacher of literature in Berlin, who was looking for likely engineers and likely people that would be useful, and at the time of the German-Russian hostilities, Many of these German scientists, from primarily from Telefunken and Siemens, winwere taken to Russia where they were,

I was going to say, "Forced labor," but they were prisoners, but well handled, and it was from the Telefunken people that the Russians got the Wollenweber DF equipment that they called the Krug. They got

electronic communications men and


These people who were Germans returned in '52, I think...

people that they divided into teams or sections...groups. These were


'51 or...'51, these Germans were returned and

But these defections, whilese sources that were interviewed, were the traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, people from the German Army, and largely targeted on Russian systems. The Army people who conducted this

Doc ID: 6556311	
	EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 64
TOP SECRET//ST	PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 64
,	
	operation were part of ASA. And later it was
	decided that TICOM was a wartime operation, a wartime title, and they
FARLEY:	What was the expansion of TICOM?
O'ROURKE:	Target Intelligence Committee, and why that's more warlike
	I don't know, but anyway.
	I don't know, but anyway.
	· ·
	:
	<u>:</u>
	:
·	
•	
	:
FARLEY:	
O'ROURKE:	
FARLEY:	Oh, okay.
O'ROURKE:	•
·	
·	



TOD CECDET / /C



O'ROURKE:

67

EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

No, I have just recorded my changes in grade and changes in assignment, O'ROURKE: but I think that's not necessarily.... We could put it in the folder, if you have another copy. Let's put it FARLEY: in your folder. The sing of there's nothing really critical I'll see that you get it. O'ROURKE: here, just a progression, but I thought that it's interesting to start with the right salary. You did well, compared to some of those people. FARLEY: O'ROURKE: Yes. Helen, what I'd like to do now, since we've pretty well moved up to '46, FARLEY: O'ROURKE: I was working in AS-93B as a research analyst. At that time we were receiving for the Agency the TICOM material. We were receiving the Russian TICOM material. FARLEY: Which was ...?

TICOM material was material captured or

acquired at the conclusion of World War II in Europe, in Japan, too,

Intelligence Committee material was a joint operation British-U.S. Teams

Joint teams collected this material....joint British-American teams.

They also accomplished interrogations of knowledgeable Germans who

had been apprehended. Athey, ITICOM material,

POP SECRET//SI

TICOM, Target

EO 3.3b(3) EO 3.3b(6) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

68

went in to the various localities in Germany and got together, acquired however they could, materials that had been developed by the German SIGINTers, the COMINT organization. They took all the material to England where it was accessioned with an arbitrary number....just the first thing that came out of the box was given the next....was given the number. Subsequently each item was given a number. Duplicates were given separate numbers. The materials were divided. The Russian material, the material applying to Russia, was placed in a separate group from the Allo...or from the others. The Russian material was sent...copies or originals were sent to AS-93, the office headed by Ed Christopher, where they were again accessioned and sent to the working element that their work would be most closely associated with the material that was given..

The interrogations

were directed to the analytic personnel, traffic analysis people, intercept operators, cryppies, German people.

FARLEY:

O'ROURKE:


Equipments at all, Helen? Devices, equipments, cipher machines?


Not through this channel. Interrogations about them. Information about them, but not through this channel...tnat is, that I handled.


In about 1947, I guess maybe I should have said '48, it was determined

EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605


TOP SECRET//SI









Doc ID: 6556311 EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 72 FARLEY: O'ROURKE:






TOP SECRET//SI	75	EO 3.3b(3) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 OGA
		OGA
		,

Doc ID: 6556311 OGA EO 3.3b(3) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605






Doc ID: 6556311		EO 3.3b(3) OGA
TOP SECRET//SI	79	PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
•		
•		
. [


TOP SECRET//SI	80	OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
•		
·.		
1.		

C ID: 6556311	81	EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
ARLEY:		
ROURKE:		

TOP SECRET//SI	 . 82	 OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	
			٦
•			




FARLEY: O'NOURRE: FARLEY: O'NOURRE:	Doc ID: 6556311	•		
PARLEY: O'ROURKE: PARLEY: O'ROURKE:		•	EO 3.3b(3)	
PARLEY: O'ROURKE: PARLEY: O'ROURKE:		84	OGA	
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	TOP SECRET//ST		PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:			*	
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	-			
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	·			
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	•			
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	,			
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	**			
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	·			
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	· (1)			
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	_			
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	·			
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	FARLEY:			
FARLEY: O'ROURKE:				
O'ROURKE:	O'ROURKE:			
O'ROURKE:	FARLEY:			
	O'ROURKE:			
	·			
	·			
			19.	
		,		




(END TAPE III, Side 1)

Doc ID: 6556311 TOP SECRET//SI	86	EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
O'ROURKE:		
FARLEY: O'ROURKE:		



TOP SECRET//SI	88	EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	

EO 3.3b(3) EO 3.3b(6) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



Doc ID: 6556311 EO 3.3b(3) EO 3.3b(6) TOP SECRET//SI OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 91 FARLEY: O'ROURKE:


Doc ID: 6556311 EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 92


	· 93	EO 3.3b(3)	
TOP SECRET//SI		EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	
		•	
1			
·			
·			
,			
, and the second			
i			
•			
·			


Doc ID: 6556311		EO 3.3b(3)	
TOF SECRET//SI	94	OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	
•			
FARLEY:			
O'ROURKE:			
FARLEY:			
O'ROURKE:			
•			
· 			
·			
,			
	·		
		TOP SECRET//SI	-

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	95	OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
TOP SECRET//SI		
· .		
. •		
ARLEY:		

Doc ID: 6556311








Doc ID: 6556311	99	EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
FARLEY:		•
O'ROURKE:		
,		

TOP SECRET//SI	100	OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
	·	•
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
FARLEY:		

(END TAPE III, Side 2)

TOP SECRET//SI




Doc ID: 6556311 EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 103


Doc ID: 6556311 EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 105 FARLEY:

TOP SECRET//SI

TOP SECRET//ST	,	J		EO 3.3b(3) PL 86-36/5	0 USC 3605
O'ROURKE:	· ·	<u> </u>	·	x .	
O ROORNE:					
·					,
					ľ

Doc ID: 6556311		EO 3.3b(3) OGA		
TOP SECRET//SI	107	PL 86-36/50 USC 3605		
1				
FARLEY:				
1				
O'ROURKE:				
•				
·				





Doc ID: 6556311 EO 3.3b(3) OGA 111 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 FARLEY:

OC ID: 6556311	. 112	EO 3.3b(3) EO 3.3b(6) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	·
O'ROURKE:			
FARLEY: O'ROURKE:			
FARLEY:			
O'ROURKE:			
FARLEY:			
O'ROURKE:			
,			

TOP SECRET//SI	113	EO 3.3b(3) EO 3.3b(6) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
FARLEY:		
·		
O'ROURKE:		
·		
·		
·		
·		
		•

TOP SECRET//31 PL 86-36/50 USC PARLEY: PNOURKE:	3605
ARLEY:	3605
ARLEY:	
ARLEY:	
RLEY:	
ARLEY:	
ROURKE:	

TOP SECRET//SI	115	EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
		* ·
.		
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
FADI EV.		
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
- 4		
`		


Doc ID: 6556311 EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 116

TOP SECRET//SI

TOP SECRET//SI		OGA
	116	PL 86-36/50 USC
	117	į ·
(1)		
'		
• •		
• ()		
· V 2		
•		
LEY:		
OURKE:		

TOP SHCRIT//SI

FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	TOP SECRET//SI	118	EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
FARLEY: O'ROURKE: FARLEY: O'ROURKE:	FARLEY:		
PARLEY: PARLEY: PARLEY: PARLEY: PARLEY: PARLEY:			
ARLEY: 'ROURKE: ARLEY: 'ROURKE:			
'ROURKE: ARLEY: 'ROURKE: ARLEY: 'ROURKE:	'ROURKE:		
ARLEY: ARLEY: *ROURKE:	ARLEY:		
ROURKE: *ROURKE:	'ROURKE:		
ARLEY: 'ROURKE:	ARLEY:		
*ROURKE:	'ROURKE:		
ROURKE:			
ROURKE:	,		
ROURKE:			
ROURKE:			
*ROURKE:			
ROURKE:			
ROURKE:			
*ROURKE:			
*ROURKE:			
*ROURKE:	, <u> </u>		
	ARLEY:		
	ROURKE:		



TOP SECRET//SI	121	OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
O'ROURKE:		·
•		
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
,		
·		
FARLEY:		
•		
O'ROURKE:		
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
PARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
•		
·		

122

EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TOP SHORDT//SI	122	PL 86-	36/50 USC 3605
	·		•
<u> </u>			
ARLEY:			
'ROURKE:			
ADT EW.			
ARLEY:			
'ROURKE:			
ARLEY:			
'ROURKE:			
.			
3 TV 1711			
ARLEY:			
ROURKE:			
·			

TOP SECRE	3T//SI	123	EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	
			·	,
·				
FARLEY:				
O'ROURKE:				
FARLEY:	,			
O'ROURKE:				

Doc ID: 6556311	· ,	
		EO 3.3b(3)
		OGA
TOP SECRET//ST	124	PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
		•
·		
·		
. 1		
l e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e		
FARLEY:		
PARCEI.		
.,		
*		
*		
o l nounus		
O'ROURKE:		
FARLEY:		
PANESI:		
O'ROURKE:		
•		
·		
•		
•		
·		
, <u> </u>		
•		

TUP SECRET//SI	125	EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
ARLEY:		
POURKE:		
PARLEY:		
'ROURKE		
ARLEY:		
'ROURKE:		
ARLEY:		
'ROURKE:		

oc ID: 6556311	126	EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
TOP SECREI//SI	120	
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
v		
ARLEY:		
'ROURKE:		
ARLEY:		
'ROURKE:		
• • •		
·		

Doc ID: 6556311		EO 3.3b(3)
TOP SECRET//ST		OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
	. 127	
		·
,		
• •		
,		
.		
1		
Ha Dr. Dv.		
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
•		
FARLEY:		
O'ROURKE:		
•		
·		

TOP SECRET//SI	128	OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	
.			
RLEY: ROURKE:			
NOONE.			
·			
·			

TOP SECRET//SI	129	EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	5
·			
·			
FARLEY:			
O'ROURKE:			
FARLEY:			

TOP SECRE1//S1	130	EO 3.3b(3) OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	
O'ROURKE:			
o isolus.			
·			
·			
,			
ARLEY:			
'ROURKE:			
-			
,·			
• ()			

Doc ID: 6556311			EO 3.3b(3) OGA
TOP SEGRET//SI		131	PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
	·		
FARLEY:			
O'ROURKE:			
FARLEY:			
O'ROURKE:			
)."			
•			

Doc ID: 6556311 OGA EO 3.3b(3) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 132 FARLEY: O'ROURKE:

	- 5	. *		EO 3.3b(3)	
TOP SECRE	1//31		133	OGA PL 86-36/50 USC	3605
,				• •	
¥					
*					
EADE ENG.					
FARLEY:					
O'ROURKE:					
*					
FARLEY:					
O'ROURKE:					
FARLEY:					
O'ROURKE:					
O ROURE:					
FARLEY:					
O'ROURKE:					
4					ľ
				,	

oc ID: 6556311			EO 3.3b(3)
TOP SEGRET//SI	134		OGA PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
**	•		· ·
7			
(6)			
*			
\$*;			
* -			
(
(A			
FARLEY:			
O'ROURKE:			
		Take go	*

Doc ID: 6556311	:		EO 3.3b(3)	
1			OGA	
TOP SECRET/	/SI 	135	PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	
		*	, , , ,	
FARLEY:				
O'ROURKE:				
				ł
l a				
FARLEY:				
O'ROURKE:				
4				
FARLEY:				
,				
O'ROURKE:				
v .				
FARLEY:	Helen, we're down on this one	•	-	
O'ROURKE:	Well	* .	. *	•